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1
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE*
The Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics
based at Fordham University School of Law sponsors
programs, develops publications, and supports
scholarship on contemporary issues of law and
ethics, and encourages professional and public
institutions to integrate moral perspectives into
their work. The Stein Center collaborates with law
students, practitioners, judges, and legal scholars to
study and improve the legal profession with an
emphasis on the ethical and professional values at
the core of the practice of law. As part of this
mission, the Stein Center regularly cultivates
scholarly inquiry and scholarship on the professional
conduct and regulation of lawyers. Over the past
decade, the Stein Center and affiliated Fordham
Law faculty have examined the ethical dimensions of
the administration of criminal justice in the context
of the professional obligations of prosecutors.
Conflicts of interest in criminal prosecutions
implicate serious professional ethics questions
important to the Stein Center. Prosecutors, in their
pursuit of justice, owe a duty to the defendant and to
the public to carry out each prosecution in a manner
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.3, the parties have
consented to the filing of this brief. Letters of consent
have been filed with the Clerk. No counsel for a party
authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or
party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the
preparation or submission of this brief. No person other
than amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel made a
monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.
*
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that upholds the guarantees of the Constitution.
This duty necessarily encompasses the right to a
disinterested prosecutor, free from conflict, to avoid
both the actual presence of and even the appearance
of improper influence that would undermine public
trust in the criminal justice system. This interest is
heightened when the prosecution determines to seek,
and in fact obtains, a sentence of death.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The constitutional dimensions of the right to a
disinterested prosecutor affect not only the
individual defendants, but the criminal justice
system as a whole. The justice system in the United
States depends upon the fair administration of
justice, which incorporates a right to a disinterested
prosecutor. As a plurality of this Court observed in
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.,
481 U.S. 787 (1987), when an “interested party” acts
as a prosecutor, the resulting error is “fundamental
and pervasive.” Id. at 809–10 (plurality opinion).
The error undoubtedly infects the individual
conviction in ways known, unknown, and
unknowable. And it casts doubt on the procedures in
place to ensure due process under the law. For this
reason, as the same plurality determined in Vuitton,
the involvement of a conflicted prosecutor “require[s]
reversal without regard to the facts or circumstances
of a particular case.” Id. (quoting Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)).
Such a rule is important not only to protect
defendants, but to make clear the professional
standards to which prosecutors must hold
themselves and to encourage compliance with these
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standards. Following Vuitton, state and federal
courts have struggled to determine the appropriate
standard by which to assess whether the
participation of an interested prosecutor gives rise to
a conflict, whether such participation qualifies as a
due process violation, and what the remedy should
be. Courts often attempt to examine the harm or
prejudice caused in a certain prosecution. But this
standard—in addition to not addressing the damage
caused to the integrity of the judicial system—also
leaves prosecutors unable to determine in real time
whether they must recuse themselves and what the
consequences of the participation will be.
The petition and the decisions below exemplify
the inadequacy of the current regime and the
importance of a clear and easily applied test of the
due process interests at stake. Sue Korioth worked
alongside both the Kaufman County District
Attorney Michael McLelland, of whose murder
petitioner ultimately was convicted, and First
Assistant DA Mark Hasse, in whose murder
petitioner was implicated during the sentencing
phase that resulted in a death sentence. Pet. App. B
at 13, 84. Although Korioth recognized that neither
she nor anyone else in her office should prosecute
the crimes that had been committed against her coworkers and McLelland’s wife, Cynthia—indeed,
Korioth drafted the recusal motions that the trial
court granted in both instances—she nonetheless
participated in both the investigation and the
prosecution. Id. at 85–86, 88. Korioth advised,
researched, discussed, drafted, and edited the
materials, filings, and decisions underlying a
prosecution she was statutorily disqualified from
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conducting herself. Id. at 88. But because the
evidence did not establish that her prohibited
participation rose to a level of “control” that the
court deemed sufficiently prejudicial, and because
the court found no “actual conflict” ex post, despite
Korioth’s own decision to recuse herself ex ante,
petitioner was denied relief. Id. at 110–13.
As this case illustrates, it is effectively
impossible to identify all the ways that a
prosecutor’s conflicts can shape the course of an
investigation, prosecution, and trial, and an attempt
to determine whether such errors in the very
underpinnings of the case were harmless achieves
neither justice nor efficiency. Clarifying that the
involvement of a conflicted prosecutor violates due
process and results in structural error will
encourage and empower prosecutors to meaningfully
identify and act on their ethical obligations. It will
provide courts with a workable test when evaluating
allegations that prosecutors have failed to do so.
And it will instill broader confidence that those
tasked with carrying out the public’s interest in
criminal justice are doing so without disfavor or
personal interest.
This Court should grant the petition and
summarily reverse.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE INVOLVEMENT OF A CONFLICTED
PROSECUTOR IS A DUE PROCESS
VIOLATION
AND
CONSTITUTES
STRUCTURAL ERROR

The Court should hold that a conflicted
prosecutor’s involvement in a prosecution, per se,
requires reversal because it violates a defendant’s
due process rights and constitutes structural error.
A. The Due Process Clause Affords A
Criminal Defendant The Right To A
Disinterested Prosecutor
At the heart of the analysis of the right to a trial
by a disinterested prosecution lies the Constitution.
As Justice Blackmun stated decades ago, “the
practice—federal or state—of appointing an
interested party’s counsel to prosecute for criminal
contempt is a violation of due process.” Vuitton, 481
U.S. at 814–15 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The
Constitution “requires a disinterested prosecutor
with the unique responsibility to serve the public,
rather than a private client, and to seek justice that
is unfettered.” Id. at 815.
The Vuitton case concerned a criminal contempt
prosecution undertaken by attorneys representing a
party in the underlying litigation.
Id. at 792
(majority opinion). The Court held, in a seven-vote
majority opinion, that the appointment of such an
interested prosecutor was error. Id. at 809. A fourvote plurality of the Court also concluded that this
error was structural, and required automatic
reversal. Id. at 809–14 (plurality opinion). But the
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opinions of the Court—both the majority and the
plurality—expressly based their conclusions on the
Court’s supervisory authority, and did not reach
whether the conflict of interest that the Court had
found intolerable also violated the defendant’s due
process rights. See id. at 809 (majority opinion).
Only Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion,
would have reached the constitutional issue and held
the disinterested prosecutor’s participation violated
due process.
Id. at 814–15 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
Justice Blackmun’s reasoning is nonetheless in
line with the Court’s historical approach to
identifying the process that criminal defendants are
due under the Constitution. The right to a fair trial
encompassed in the due process clauses affords
criminal defendants a panoply of rights not
specifically enumerated in the Constitution. These
rights include, inter alia, the right to an unbiased
judge, Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216
(1971), to a presumption of innocence, Estelle v.
Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976), to have the
government prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970), and
to obtain exculpatory evidence in the government’s
possession, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement
of due process,” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955), and so “[f]airness of course requires an
absence of actual bias in the trial of cases,” id. As a
result, “our system of law has always endeavored to
prevent even the probability of unfairness.” Id.
In this vein, the Court previously has recognized
that “[a] scheme injecting a personal interest,
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financial or otherwise, into the enforcement process
may bring irrelevant or impermissible factors into
the prosecutorial decision and in some contexts raise
serious constitutional questions.”
Marshall v.
Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249–50 (1980); see also
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“It is
as much [the prosecutor’s] duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to
bring about a just one.”).
Consistent with this Court’s due process
jurisprudence and with Justice Blackmun’s
concurring opinion in Vuitton, numerous lower
courts have recognized that the right to a
disinterested prosecutor does indeed have a
constitutional dimension. For example, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that
prosecution by a prosecutor with impermissibly
conflicted interests “violates the requirement of
fundamental fairness assured by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Ganger v.
Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 1967). Other
courts have identified varying degrees of due process
protection against trial by a conflicted prosecutor.
See, e.g., United States ex rel. SEC v. Carter, 907
F.2d 484, 486 n.1 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v.
LaVallee, 439 F.3d 670, 681 (10th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Faulkner v. State, 260 P.3d 430, 431 (Okla. Crim.
App. 2011); In re Goodman, 210 S.W.3d 805, 808
(Tex. App. 2006); Lux v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d
145, 149 (Va. App. 1997); State v. Eldridge, 951
S.W.2d 775, 782 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); State v.
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Hunter, 313 S.C. 53, 54 (S.C. 1993); Cantrell v.
Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22, 26 (Va. 1985).
These lower court decisions, like Justice
Blackmun’s concurring opinion in Vuitton, correctly
recognize that criminal prosecution by an attorney
with a conflict of interest implicates a criminal
defendant’s right to due process.
The petition
provides an opportunity for this Court to do the
same.
B. The Involvement Of A Conflicted
Prosecutor Is Structural Error
The plurality in Vuitton observed that when an
“interested party” acts as a prosecutor, the resulting
error is “so fundamental and pervasive that [it]
require[s] reversal without regard to the facts or
circumstances of a particular case.” 481 U.S. at 809–
10 (plurality opinion) (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.
at 681). The plurality’s conclusion that the error
was not subject to harmless error review but instead
required reversal in every instance is of a piece with
the
Court’s
subsequent
structural
error
jurisprudence.
In Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899
(2017), the Court identified “at least three broad
rationales” for exempting an error from harmless
error review: (1) “when the error’s effects are simply
too hard to measure,” (2) when “the right at issue is
not designed to protect the defendant from erroneous
conviction but instead protects some other interest,”
and (3) when “the error always results in
fundamental unfairness.” Id. at 1908. All three
considerations militate in favor of a structural-error
treatment of prosecutorial conflicts.
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Difficulty of measurement.
There is no
reliable method of measuring how the interests and
biases that a conflicted prosecutor brings to a
prosecution affect subsequent decision-making,
either by that prosecutor individually or by a
broader team. Prosecutorial communication and
decision-making happen off the record, outside the
view of the court. Accordingly, it is effectively
entirely obscured from later judicial review. See,
e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)
(“[T]he decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited
to judicial review.”); Bruce A. Green & Rebecca
Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of Interest,
58 B.C. L. Rev. 463, 491 (2017) (noting that “actual
prejudice” in the case of a conflicted prosecutor is
“nearly impossible to show, given that there is no
discovery of prosecutors’ internal decision-making
and, in any event, prosecutors themselves may be
unaware of the cognitive impact of a conflict”).
In Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899
(2016), a case involving an analogously difficult-tomeasure potential for bias, the Court held that the
mere participation of one conflicted judge on a threejudge panel constituted structural error requiring
reversal in every instance. Id. at 1909–10. The
Court reasoned that, “while the influence of any
single participant in [the judicial] process can never
be measured with precision, experience teaches us
that each member’s involvement plays a part in
shaping the court’s ultimate disposition.” Id. at 1909
(quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813,
831 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring)). So too may
the involvement of a conflicted prosecutor “shape”
the course of a criminal prosecution by influencing
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the decision to indict, whether to offer a plea, how to
conduct the trial, and what penalties to seek. See
Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Discretion:
The
Difficulty and Necessity of Public Inquiry, 123 Dick.
L. Rev. 589, 595–601 (2019) (discussing the
enormous impact that prosecutors’ exercise of
discretion has on a prosecution). As a result, a
“[h]armless-error analysis in such a context would be
a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred
in an alternate universe.” United States v. GonzalezLopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006).
Because a
conflicted prosecution can create harm yet evade a
harmless error review, it is properly treated as a
structural error.
Interests beyond a reliable outcome. The
public has an interest in appointed or elected
prosecutors doing the public’s work without
improper consideration of personal interests. The
presence of a conflict does not just call into doubt the
standing of one prosecutor in a single case, but can
work to undermine public faith in the criminal
justice system, much like the participation of a
biased judge. See Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1909
(“[T]he appearance of bias demeans the reputation
and integrity not just of one jurist, but of the large
institution of which her or she is a part.”). As the
Vuitton plurality recognized, the participation of a
conflicted prosecutor raises doubts that “undermine[]
confidence in the integrity of the criminal
proceeding,” and “‘calls into question the objectivity
of those charged with bringing a defendant to
judgment.’” 481 U.S. at 810 (plurality opinion)
(quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263
(1986)).
A prosecution involving an interested
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prosecutor undermines the public’s trust in the
judicial system and the public’s interest in a just
outcome.
Fundamental unfairness.
Finally, it is
fundamentally unfair to a defendant to have to
contend with the awesome power of the state’s
prosecuting authority if that office is dedicated not
only to doing justice but to achieving a particular
outcome with respect to that particular defendant,
even if the interests of justice would dictate a
different outcome. Trial by a conflicted judge is
fundamentally unfair and not amenable to harmless
error analysis, see Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535
(1927), as are other “structural defects in the
constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy
analysis by ‘harmless error’ standards,” Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991). Like those
errors in the basic architecture by which a defendant
is charged, tried, and convicted, and unlike errors
which occur “during the presentation of the case to
the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively
assessed in the context of other evidence presented,”
id. at 307–08, the involvement of a conflicted
prosecutor calls the entire proceeding into question
and does not lend itself to an appellate
determination of how a prosecution by an unbiased
prosecutor would have differed, as is necessary to
deem a constitutional violation harmless.
Each of the bases for finding structural error are
present in this case, as in other cases in which
prosecutors have conflicts of interest. A criminal
prosecutor “is not disinterested if he has . . . an axe
to grind against the defendant, as distinguished
from the appropriate interest that members of
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society have in bringing a defendant to justice with
respect to the crime with which he is charged.”
Wright v. United States, 732 F.2d 1048, 1056 (2d Cir.
1984) (Friendly, J.). By recusing herself and her
office from prosecuting petitioner but nonetheless
playing an extensive behind-the-scenes role in
petitioner’s arrest, conviction, and death sentence,
Korioth applied that principle in word, but not in
deed. The extent of Korioth’s influence on the
innumerable discretionary and strategic choices that
occur in a prosecution for capital murder are
unknown and unknowable, and the lower courts’
attempt to re-weigh the animus she had recognized
merited disqualification and to measure the extent
she brought that conflict to bear on such decisions
was unsurprisingly fruitless. Korioth’s bias and the
resulting impact on petitioner’s conviction and
sentence were difficult to measure, at odds with the
public’s interest in the neutral application of justice,
and fundamentally unfair.
II. A STRUCTURAL-ERROR RULE WOULD
PROVIDE PROSECUTORS WITH THE
MEANS TO AVOID A DUE PROCESS
VIOLATION
A clear statement that the involvement of a
conflicted prosecutor amounts to a due process
violation and qualifies as structural error not only
would protect the integrity of the judicial system and
the rights of individual defendants, but it also would
be likely to lessen the occurrence of prosecutions
tainted by conflict. Lower courts have frequently
conflated the analyses for judging a conflict, due
process violation, and appropriate remedy when
faced with a prosecution involving a conflicted
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prosecutors. Prosecutors are left with an amorphous
test for assessing their own conduct and the
consequences of it.
The articulation of a bright-line rule holding
that
an
improperly
conflicted
prosecutor’s
involvement requires reversal in every instance
would resolve a lack of uniformity in this area of law,
and thereby encourage and empower prosecutors to
avoid the participation of a conflicted prosecutor.
A. The Different Standards For Assessing
The Nature Of And Remedy For A
Prosecutor Conflict Fail To Provide
Prosecutors With Clear Guidance
Necessary To Comply With Their
Ethical Obligations
As discussed, supra Part I.B, the plurality
opinion in Vuitton “establish[ed] a categorical rule
against the appointment of an interested prosecutor,
adherence to which requires no subtle calculations of
judgment.” 481 U.S. at 814 (plurality opinion).
However, given the lack of a majority opinion or
subsequent guidance from the Court on this point,
few lower courts have similarly concluded that
“reversal is automatic if conflict is found.” United
States v. Lanier, 879 F.3d 141, 151 (5th Cir. 2018);
see, e.g., Faulkner, 260 P.3d at 433 (rejecting
argument that defendant had to show actual harm
from
involvement of
conflicted prosecutor);
Commonwealth v. Eskridge, 604 A.2d 700, 702 (Pa.
1992) (“We hold that a prosecution is barred when
an actual conflict of interest affecting the prosecutor
exists in the case; under such circumstances a
defendant need not prove actual prejudice in order to
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require that the conflict be removed.”); see also
Sinclair v. State, 363 A.2d 468, 475 (Md. 1976) (preVuitton decision requiring automatic reversal of
conviction based on impermissible prosecutorial
conflict).
Other courts have disregarded the plurality’s
rule in Vuitton and instead have required
defendants who challenge the disinterestedness of
their prosecutors to “prove actual prejudice” on
appeal. Heldt, 668 F.2d at 1277; see, e.g., United
States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 460 (2d Cir. 1991)
(defendants must “establish[] that they were
prejudiced by any conflict of interest” to obtain
relief); United States v. Kahre, 737 F.3d 554, 574
(9th Cir. 2013) (“[D]efendants must demonstrate
prejudice from the prosecutor’s potential conflict of
interest.”); Webber v. Scott, 390 F.3d 1169, 1176–77
(10th Cir. 2004) (applying harmless error analysis);
United States v. Spiker, 649 F. App’x 770, 771 (11th
Cir. 2016) (requiring prejudice); Pabst v. State, 192
P.3d 630, 639–40 (Kan. 2008) (requiring prejudice
under state law); People v. Vasquez, 137 P.3d 199,
213 (Cal. 2006) (requiring prejudice to reverse
conviction obtained by prosecutor who should have
recused under state law).
Nor do lower courts all agree on the allocation of
the burden, even when they otherwise agree that
prosecution by a conflicted prosecutor can potentially
be excused as harmless. The Fourth Circuit, in a
frequently cited decision, applied harmless error
analysis but placed the burden on the government to
prove the due process violation was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. Ganger, 379 F.2d at 714–15.
Similarly, but not identically, the Court of Appeals of
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New York has reasoned that “the practical
impossibility of establishing that the conflict has
worked to defendant’s disadvantage dictates the
adoption of standards under which a reasonable
potential for prejudice will suffice.”
People v.
Zimmer, 414 N.E.2d 705, 707 (N.Y. 1980); see also
Spiker, 649 F. App’x at 774 (finding plain error and
reversing conviction obtained by interested
prosecutor due to “the far-reaching effect” of the
prosecutor’s choices and because the conflict
“seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of a judicial proceeding”).
This inconsistent review for prejudice obscures
more than it illuminates. Courts routinely fail to
distinguish clearly between their analyses of
whether
a
particular
prosecutor
had
an
impermissible conflict of interest, whether an
impermissibly conflicted prosecutor was sufficiently
involved in a prosecution to call it into question, and
whether a defendant was ultimately prejudiced.
Compare, e.g., In re Jackson, 51 A.3d 529, 539 n.13
(D.C. 2012) (“The prosecutor is not disinterested if
he or she ‘has a special motivation to favor the
victim or satisfy a victim’s private agenda if that
agenda is inconsistent with the prosecutor’s public
duty to serve all the people neutrally, i.e., equally
and fairly.’”) (quoting Bennett L. Gershman,
Prosecutorial Ethics and Victims’ Rights:
The
Prosecutor’s Duty of Neutrality, 9 Lewis & Clark L.
Rev. 559, 563 (2005)), with, e.g., Person v. Miller, 854
F.2d 656, 664 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding no reversible
error where undisputedly interested party’s attorney
participated in prosecution because “[t]here [was] no
suggestion that the United States Attorney . . . did
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not
exercise
judgment”).

an

independent

prosecutorial

The decision below recognized and indeed
exemplifies the lack of clarity in the relevant law.
The trial court’s Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law relied on secondary authority for
the proposition that Vuitton “did not settle the issue
of whether a prosecutor’s lack of disinterestedness
can constitute a per se violation of due process or
whether disinterestedness is subject to harmless
error analysis.” Pet. App. B at 111 (quoting Edward
L. Wilkinson, Conflicts of Interest in Texas Criminal
Cases, 54 Baylor L. Rev. 171, 187 (2002)). And the
ensuing analysis conflated prosecutor Korioth’s
conflict of interest, Korioth’s involvement in
petitioner’s prosecution, and whether petitioner was
prejudiced. In assessing whether Korioth was a
“decision maker,” the court observed that “the
evidence of [petitioner’s] guilt is strong,” which is
relevant to prejudice. Id. at 94. In assessing
whether Korioth had an actual conflict of interest
due to her friendship with a victim, the court
observed that petitioner “fail[ed] to prove Korioth
committed
misconduct
towards
[petitioner’s]
prosecution based on her friendship,” which is
relevant to her involvement. Id. at 104. And in
assessing whether petitioner was prejudiced, the
court observed that he “was tried by an impartial
judge and jury, he was represented by counsel, and
he had a full opportunity to present his case,” none
of which addresses the role of the prosecutor. Id. at
113.
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B. Barring Participation By Conflicted
Prosecutors Gives Prosecutors Clear
Tools To Analyze And Comply With
Their Ethical Obligations
Given these muddled and divergent standards
for evaluating impermissible prosecutorial conflicts,
prosecutors are left to engage in a guessing game as
to their ethical obligations in any given case. Unlike
private attorneys, prosecutors cannot defer to a
client to assess or waive conflicts of interest. Green
& Roiphe, supra, at 505. Prosecutors themselves are
often the only and final arbiters of whether or not to
recuse, and may fail to consider the effect that their
involvement or presence may have on discretionary
decisions in the case. Id. at 505–06. The importance
of self-regulation among prosecutors is only
heightened by their historical hostility and
resistance to professional regulation by external
bodies such as bar associations. See Bruce A. Green,
Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, 25 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 873, 875–82 (2012).
A standard that looks uniquely to the existence
of a conflict gives prosecutors a clear, bright-line rule
at the outset of a prosecution to determine whether
they may be involved. Not only does it take a much
needed zero-tolerance policy regarding the potential
for impermissible influence, but it also operates to
ensure public confidence in the system by focusing
on the knowable potential for impropriety, rather
than the unknowable, case-by-case inquiry of actual
prejudice. Green & Roiphe, supra, at 491.
Conversely, an involvement- or prejudice-based
standard lacks clarity and requires a prosecutor to
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reevaluate the sliding scale of the seriousness of the
conflict and the degree of their involvement
throughout the litigation.
It also requires
prosecutors to account for biases and influence that
they themselves may not even be aware of. See id.
Moreover, because prosecutors’ offices do not
typically record their deliberative processes in detail,
requiring a defendant to demonstrate actual
prejudice imposes a near-impossible task unless the
degree of the conflict is so significant that there can
be no doubt as to its effect. If such a standard were
applied, it would discourage prosecutors with serious
but less blatant conflicts from recusing themselves,
knowing that a defendant will be unable to satisfy
the ultimate burden of demonstrating harm.
CONCLUSION
This Court should grant the petition for
certiorari and summarily reverse the decision of the
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
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